5th year Econ PhD Candidate at NYU
19 W 4th Street, 10012, New York, NY
My research interests are in Empirical IO and Applied Microeconomics. In my job market paper I study how residential choices and endogenous amenites are simultaneously determined by leveraging housing supply shifts induced by short-term rentals. I aIso have projects in Applied Theory and Microeconometrics.
LOCATION SORTING AND ENDOGENOUS AMENITIES: EVIDENCE FROM SHORT-TERM RENTALS IN AMSTERDAM, JMP
Work in Progress. Joint with Tomás Domínguez-Iino
This paper provides evidence on the reinforcing relationship between location choice and endogenous amenities, as well as its role in determining the welfare of a city's residents. We leverage the entry of homesharing platforms such as Airbnb to show how a shock to a city's equilibrium is propagated by this feedback mechanism. We build a dynamic model of a rental market where a short-term rental sector shifts housing supply away from locals, and where amenities endogenously respond to neighborhood composition. We estimate the model using restricted access Dutch microdata which allows us to track the universe of Amsterdam's residents over time, as well as the evolution of a rich set of neighborhood amenities. While efficiency gains result from the reduction of matching frictions in the short-term rental market, distributional effects arise since housing available to locals is reduced and consumption amenities increasingly cater to tourists' tastes. Finally, we use our model to evaluate policy proposals that are currently being debated across the world to regulate short-term rentals, speaking to a classic tradeoff between efficiency and equity.
Presented at (by coauthor or myself): NYU Applied Microeconomics Student Lunch, NYU Stern Industrial Organization Workshop, NYU Econometrics Student Lunch
Working Paper. Joint work with David Andrés.
This paper explores the dynamics of nation-building policies and the conditions under which a state can promote a shared national identity on its territory. A forward-looking central government that internalizes identity dynamics shapes them by choosing the level of political centralization. Homogenization attempts are constrained by political unrest and by the intergenerational transmission of identities within the family. We find nation-building efforts are generally characterized by fast interventions. We show that a zero-sum conflict over resources pushes long-run dynamics toward homogeneous steady states and extreme levels of (de)centralization. We also find the ability to foster a common identity is highly dependent on initial conditions, and that country-specific historical factors can have a lasting impact on the long-run distribution of identities.
Conditionally Accepted at Theoretical Economics.